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Really Bites: The Effect of 
the U. S .-Level Minimum 
on Puerto Rico 
Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
Since the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in  1938, Puerto Rico has 
been subject to minimum wage regulations. For many years, industry boards 
set separate minima by industry and occupation that were markedly below the 
U.S.  federal minimum wage.  In  1974, the U.S.  Congress, supported by the 
Puerto Rican government, initiated a policy to raise the level and coverage of 
federally mandated minimum wages on the island to U.S. standards. By 1983, 
the minimum wage in Puerto Rico reached the $3.35 per hour rate then pre- 
vailing in the United States, and coverage matched the U.S. rate of 60 percent 
or more of the work force. With hourly earnings on the island just two-thirds 
of mainland hourly earnings, the result was an extraordinarily high ratio of 
the minimum wage to average pay-producing  a minimum wage with genu- 
ine economic bite. 
To what extent has the U. S.  -level minimum reduced employment in Puerto 
Rico? How important has migration been in adjusting to the minimum wage- 
induced loss of jobs? Has the minimum contributed to the migration of less- 
educated and less-skilled Puerto Ricans to the United States (Ramos, in this 
volume)? 
This paper seeks to answer these questions using diverse bodies of data on 
employment and earnings in Puerto Rico and on the employment and earnings 
of Puerto Rican migrants in the United States. It reports the following find- 
ings.  (1) The U.S.-level  minimum  altered  the  distribution  of  earnings  in 
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Puerto Rico to an extraordinary extent, creating marked spikes that dominate 
the earnings distribution.  (2) Imposing the U.S.-level minimum reduced total 
island  employment by  8-10  percent compared to the level that would have 
prevailed had the minimum been the same proportion of average wages as in 
the United  States. In addition,  it reallocated  labor across industries, greatly 
reducing jobs in low-wage sectors that had to raise minima substantially  to 
reach federal levels. (3) Migrants from Puerto Rico to the United States are 
drawn  largely  from persons jobless  on the  island,  with  characteristics that 
make them liable to have been  disemployed by the minimum  wage.  As the 
Puerto Rican minimum rose toward U.S. levels, the education of migrants fell 
below that of nonmigrants.  (4) Migration was critical in allowing Puerto Rico 
to institute U.S.-level  minimum wages and played  a major role in the long- 
term growth of real earnings in Puerto Rico by reducing the labor supply and 
raising the average qualifications of workers on the island. 
We present the evidence for these claims in four stages. First, we describe 
the minimum wage system in Pugrto Rico and show that it altered the island’s 
distribution of earnings.  Second, we estimate the employment consequences 
of the minimum using time-series and cross-industry data. Third, we examine 
the volume and characteristics of  migrants to the United States as the island 
moved toward the federal minimum. Finally, we consider the consequences of 
migration for the minimum wage system and outcomes in the Puerto Rican 
labor market. 
6.1  The Minimum Wage in Puerto Rico 
The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established minimum wages in 
Puerto Rico as it did in the United States proper. At first, the law applied the 
mainland  minimum  rate  ($0.35)  to Puerto  Rico, but Congress soon recog- 
nized  that this would devastate the island’s economy and passed  a separate 
amendment that established committees in some forty industries to set sepa- 
rate industry  and occupational  minima “that would not substantially curtail 
employment” while also not giving Puerto Rico “an unfair competitive advan- 
tage  over  mainland  competitors”  (U.S. Department  of  Commerce  1979, 
2:633-42).  From  1940 until  1974, amendments to the FLSA expanded cov- 
erage on the island but maintained the industry-committee  mode of  setting 
minima. With the  1974 and 1977 Amendments to the FLSA, however, Con- 
gress introduced  a new policy, increasing coverage and enacting automatic 
increases in Puerto Rican minima to bring them to the U.S. level. The 1977 
Amendment  required  industries  with  minima  at  U.S. levels  to  follow  the 
scheduled mainland increases and those whose minima were below U.S. lev- 
els to increase wages by $0.30 per year until they reached the federal mini- 
mum. By 1983, Puerto Rico had effectively reached the mainland minimum. 
Table 6.1 records levels of the minimum wage and coverage on the island 
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Table 6.1  Minimum Wage, MinimumiHnurly Earnings in Manufacturing, and 
Coverage 
Puerto Rico  United States 
(Min./Mfg.)  (Min./Mfg.) 
Min. ($)  Min./Mfg.  Cov.  X  Cov.  Min. ($)  Min./Mfg.  Cov.  X  Cov. 















.20  .41  .29  .I4  .15 
.45  .10  .29  .20  1 .oo 
.61  .62  .29  .I8  1.15 
.12  .64  .29  .I9  1.25 
.91  .70  .44  .31  I .40 
1.10  .11  .44  .31  1.60 
1.68  .12  .41  .34  2.00 
1.87  .13  .66  .48  2.10 
2.03  .13  .64  .47  2.30 
2.5 1  .75  .64  .48  2.65 
2.71  .15  .64  .48  2.90 
3.00  .15  .64  .48  3.10 
3.26  .I4  .64  .41  3.35 
3.35  .63  .64  .40  3.35 
.52  .36  .19 
.51  .38  .19 
SO  .43  .22 
.5 1  .44  .22 
.50  .55  .28 
.53  .54  .29 
.45  .62  .28 
.44  .60  .26 
.44  .60  .26 
.43  .62  .21 
.43  .63  .21 
.43  .63  .21 
.42  .63  .26 
.34  .64  .22 
Sources: herto  Rico: minimum calculated from U.S. Department of Labor’s “Minimum Wage 
Industry Studies”; average hourly earnings in manufacturing from the Yearbook of  Labour Statis- 
tics; coverage based on unpublished estimates from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment 
Standards Administration.  United States: minimum wages from the 1990 Staristical Abstract of 
the  United States.  table 675; manufacturing earnings from the  1990 Economic  Report of  rhe 
President; coverage is estimated from Welch (1978) by multiplying by  ratio of nonagricultural 
private employees to total employment. 
Note: Cov = number of covered nonsupervisory employees divided by civilian employment 
gress changed the law and in 1987. As there was no single minimum in Puerto 
Rico until the 1980s, the pre-1983 “average minimum” for the island in col- 
umn  1 is the employment-weighted average of  forty-four  separate industry 
minima (based in some cases on averages of occupational minima within in- 
dustry, as described in Castillo [  19831). Column 2 gives the ratio of the aver- 
age  minimum to average  hourly  earnings  in  manufacturing;  it  shows  that 
industry boards set rates on the order of 60-70  percent of average manufactur- 
ing earnings through  1974. Column 3 presents estimates of the ratio of the 
number of workers covered by the minimum to civilian employment. Because 
agriculture, government, and much of the trade and service sector were not 
covered by the law, however,  only 29 percent of the island  work force was 
subject to the minimum from the  1950s though  1967, compared  to much 
higher proportions of the U.S. work force. As a result, until  1967 the ratio of 
the coverage-weighted minimum to  average earnings-a  crude measure  of 
the overall strength of the minimum wage-was  lower in Puerto Rico than in 
the United  States (col. 4 vs.  col. 8). Hence, the effect of the minimum on 
the aggregate Puerto Rican labor market was modest. Not until  1975 did the 180  Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
coverage-weighted  minimum on the island markedly  exceed the U.S. level, 
after which it remained 80 percent or so higher through  1987. 
6.1.1 
An effective minimum wage should produce spikes in the distribution of 
earnings in the area of the minimum, allowing the analyst to infer the level of 
the  minimum  from the shape of the distribution.  Our investigation  of  three 
data  sets of  earnings  shows  such a pattern  for the  island,  with remarkable 
spikes at the relevant minima in each distribution, implying that the minimum 
wage law is a major determinant of actual wages paid. 
The first data set consists of wage distributions for workers in covered in- 
dustries obtained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Department of Labor 
(“Minimum Wage Industry Studies”) as part of its assessment of separate in- 
dustry minima through the early 1970s. We examined distributions for dozens 
of industries and found that, in all low-wage industries, an extraordinary pro- 
portion of workers was paid the industry minimum, with modal pay changing 
with changes in the minimum. For example, in  1964, the hourly minimum 
was $0.83 in shoes and related products, and 41 percent of workers received 
exactly $0.83; in  1968, when the industry minimum had increased to $1.17, 
84 percent were paid $1.17. Similarly, in 1964, when the hourly minimum in 
the  women’s  and  children’s  underwear  industry  was  $0.96, 49 percent  of 
workers received $0.96, whereas in  1972, when the industry minimum was 
$1.45,  41 percent received that wage.  In rubber products, 46 percent  were 
paid the $0.98 minimum in 1963 and 36 percent the $1.32 minimum in 1969. 
Comparable  distributions  for  industries in  the  United  States show  no such 
bunching of wages around the minimum except for such sectors as sawmills 
in the south in the early years of the minimum wage law. 
Second, an examination of earnings from the  1980 Census of Population 
for Puerto Rico reveals spikes at pay levels where differing industry minima 
covered workers during the period  of  transition  to the U.S.  minimum.  The 
Census asked individuals to report annual earnings, weeks worked, and usual 
hours worked per week in the preceding year; we used these data to calculate 
hourly pay by dividing annual earnings by weeks worked times hours worked 
per week.’ In contrast to the Department of Labor’s surveys, the Census en- 
compasses the entire island, is obtained from individuals who have no incen- 
tive to report wages at the minimum, and covers the period when federal reg- 
ulation rather than industry boards set the minima.  Figure 6.  la  displays the 
distribution of  1979 hourly pay for full-time workers in Puerto Rico from the 
Census  files.  Since not  all industries had  reached  the federal minimum  in 
Effect of the Minimum on Wages 
1.  One disadvantage of the Census data is that they have not been  cleaned for errors due to 
miscoding etc., as is typically done with CPS data. We deleted observations when weeks worked 
was less than twenty, when hours worked last week was less than ten or equal to ninety-nine, and 
when wage was less than $0.50 per hour. 181  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
1979, the law cannot be expected to create a single spike in the earnings dis- 
tribution.  In 1979, approximately 50 percent of covered workers were at the 
U.S. minimum of $2.90,. 13  percent were covered by a minimum within $0.10 
of  that value, and 25 percent were covered by the industry minimum in the 
$2.50-$2.60  range.  An effective minimum would thus produce one spike at 
$2.90 and a smaller one around $2.50-$2.60.  The figure shows such a pat- 
tern. 
A third source of  data on the Puerto Rican  earnings distribution  is usual 
hourly earnings (= usual weekly earnings/usual hours worked) from the Cur- 
rent Population Survey (CPS) in Puerto Rico. The CPS provides earnings in- 
formation in the  1980s, when the Puerto Rican  minimum reached  the U.S. 
level throughout the island. The CPS usual weekly earnings and hours infor- 
mation is closer to wage rates than the census figures for annual earnings and 
hours/weeks worked and thus should be subject to smaller measurement error 
than  the Census data. We  estimated the distribution of  hourly  earnings for 
Puerto Rico using CPS files for  1983 and  1988. The distributions for both 
years show the dominance  of the U.S.  minimum on the island’s pattern of 
earnings.  Figure 6. lb  displays  the distribution of hourly  earnings from the 
CPS for 1983. It reveals a spike around the $3.35 U.S. minimum: 25 percent 
of the workers were paid between $3.30 and $3.40 in that year. The change in 
the shape of the earnings distribution from one centered on $2.50-$2.60  and 
$2.90 in  1979 to one centered on $3.35 in  1983 indicates that imposition of 
the U.S. minimum on Puerto Rico altered the distribution of pay on the island. 
Figure 6. lc  gives the comparable distribution for 1988, at which time the U.S. 
minimum had been in effect for roughly five years. The spike in the $3.30- 
$3.40 range is as pronounced as in 1983, with 28 percent paid in this range, 
the vast majority at exactly $3.35. That the $3.35 minimum continued to be 
the modal rate of pay despite five years of  rising nominal average wages is 
striking evidence that the minimum did indeed constrain island wage setting. 
As a final test of how the minimum affected earnings in Puerto Rico, we 
regressed the log of average hourly earnings economy-wide and in manufac- 
turing on the log of the minimum wage from 1951 to 1987, controlling for a 
general time trend, real GNP in Puerto Rico, and the GNP deflator in Puerto 
Rico. We used three related statistical specifications: ordinary least squares, a 
first-order autoregressive structure, and least squares with earnings lagged one 
year as an additional regressor.  The minimum obtained a positive significant 
coefficient in each regression (table 6.2) with elasticities in the range of 0.2- 
0.4. The below-unit elasticities are consistent with the evidence in figure 6.1 
that the minimum affects the shape of the earnings distribution by increasing 
wages at the lower end rather than by producing general wage inflation. 
In sum, imposition of the U.S.-level minimum wage in Puerto Rico altered 
hourly earnings  on the  island  in  ways that  make  Puerto Rico an excellent 
institutional setting for assessing the effects of the minimum on the job mar- 
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Rico that textbook discussions of  wage-fixing laws lead one to expect? Has 
the minimum wage affected migrant flows as well? 
6.2  Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage 
To  determine the employment effects of  the minimum, we performed two 
related analyses.  First, we used time-series data to estimate the effect of  the 
minimum on the employment-population rate and unemployment rate on the 183  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
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Fig. 6.1  Distribution of hourly earnings in Puerto Rico 
Source:  a, 1980 Puerto Rican Census.  b,  1983 Puerto Rican CPS. c, June  1988 Puerto Rican 
CPS. 
Nore:  The Census data are  based  on annual earnings.  We  deleted  observations  when  weeks 
worked was less than twenty, when hours worked last week was less than ten or equal to ninety- 
nine, and when the wage was less than $0.50 per hour. 
Table 6.2  .  The Effect of  the Minimum Wage on Average Earnings in Puerto 
Rico, 1951-87 
Average Earnings  Average Manufacturing Earnings 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  -4.34  -3.69  -2.10  -  .26  -  .42  -  .21 
Log min.  .32  .27  .I9  .31  .21  .20 
(.@)  (.05)  (.04)  (.05)  (.07)  (.04) 
Trend  .01  .03  -  .oo  .04  .05  -  .oo 
(.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.02) 
Log PR def.  .39  .45  .I5  .I9  .06  .09 
(.12)  (. 11)  (.W  (.2%  (.09) 
Log PR GNP  .51  .02  .30  .01  -  .03  .05 
(.07)  ~03)  ~07)  (.20)  (. 16)  (.06) 
Lagged earnings  .I2 
(.09) 
R2  ,999  ,999  ,999  ,998  ,999  ,999 
SE  ,028  .025  .020  ,031  ,028  ,022 
AN  1)  ...  .61  ...  ...  .81  ... 
(. 14) 
Source: Estimated by the authors from data in app. A. 
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island. Our time-series regressions are based on models analogous to those in 
U.S.  minimum wage studies (see Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen  1982) in which 
the  key  independent  variable  is an average of the ratio of  the minimum  to 
average earnings  times  coverage  among  industries.  Second, exploiting  the 
fact that industries in herto  Rico had different minima for many years and 
reached the U.S.  level at different times, we estimated a cross-sectional time- 
series model linking industry employment to industry minima. 
Table  6.3 presents  the  results  of  our  time-series  analysis for the  period 
1951-87.  As employment and population data for Puerto Rico are given in 
calendar year and fiscal year terms and are periodically revised on the basis of 
the latest Census of Population, we present estimates using two related em- 
ployment  and population  series.  In columns  1-2,  our dependent variable is 
based on calendar year employment and population data for persons aged 16 
and over adjusted to the  1980 Census for  1963-87  and fiscal year data for 
persons aged 14 and over for earlier years.* In columns 3-4,  our dependent 
variable uses a consistent fiscal year series for persons aged 14 and over, also 
adjusted to the 1980 census benchmark. In columns 5-6,  the dependent vari- 
able is the In of the unemployment rate. For the minimum, we use two related 
measures.  The first is a “Kaitz” employment-weighted  average of each sec- 
tor’s minimudaverage hourly earnings multiplied by its coverage: 
where a, is industry  i’s share of  island  employment; mi  is the  minimum in 
industry i, wi  is the average hourly earnings in industry i, and c, is the coverage 
in industry i.  The second measure is the ratio of the average minimum (m)  to 
averagelhourly earnings (w)  in the economy multiplied by an economy-wide 
coverage figure obtained from a different  source than the industry coverage 
figures (see app. A).3  In all cases, the regressions are in In  form and include 
Puerto Rican and U.S. GNPs (in In constant dollars) and a linear trend. Be- 
cause ordinary least squares regressions showed considerable serial correla- 
tion, the calculations are based on an AR(1) model (OLS estimates yielded 
larger coefficients on the minimum, so our results are the more conservative 
ones)  .4 
The regressions show that, however specified, the minimum had a signifi- 
cant effect on the employment-population rate, with estimated short-run elas- 
ticities that range from 0.15 (cols.  I and 3) to 0.10 (col. 4). These elasticities 
2.  There is only a modest effect of  changing from the age 14 and over to the age 16 and over 
data (see U.S. Department of Commerce 1979,2:600, table 16). 
3. Because the minimum wage alters average earnings in herto  Rico, however, we also esti- 
mated a model in which the GDP deflator for Puerto Rico replaces average earnings as the deflator 
in the minimum variable. Our results are similar but weaker than those in the table. 
4.  The OLS specification yielded coefficients (standard errors) for the minimum wage variables 
in the columns  in  the table  of  -.24  (.05), -  .I9 (.04),  -.I8  (.05), and -  .I4 (.04) on the 
employment-population regressions and of .29 (.26) and .27 (.20) on the unemployment rate. 185  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
Table 6.3  Regression Coefficients (standard errors) for the Effect of the Minimum 
Wage (and other factors) on Employment-Population  and Unemployment 
Rates in Puerto Rico, 1951-87 
Employment Rate  Unemployment Rate 
Minimum: 
Kaitz 
(MiniAvg.)  X comp. 
Puerto Rican GNP 




















.27  .04 
(.Ill  (. 10) 
.37  .62 
(.22)  (.25) 
(.006)  (.006) 
-.024  -.024 
-5.54  -5.70 
.64  .43 
(. 16)  (. 19) 
.92  .91 
,027  ,029 
.27 
(.20) 
-  .84 























Source: Estimated using data in app. A. Employment rate: measure A uses the PREFQP  series, measure 
B the PREPOPF series. 
are of comparable magnitude to those found on the effects of the minimum on 
teenage employment in the  United  States prior to the  1980s (Brown  1988; 
Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982) but with lower standard errors, presumably 
because in Puerto Rico a much greater proportion of the work force is affected 
by the minimum, giving us the equivalent of  a larger data set from which to 
draw statistical inferences. In addition to the calculations in table 6.3,  we did 
several other analyses of the time-series data to check on the robustness of our 
findings.  In one set of  calculations, we  added  additional  lagged  dependent 
variables: the coefficients on the minimum wage variable were similar in mag- 
nitude and significance to those in the table, and the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable were on the order of 1/2. If we interpret the lagged coeffi- 
cients  in  a  partial  adjustment context,  the  responses  of  employment are 
roughly twice those in table 6.3.5  In another set of calculations, we estimated 
ARIMA models of different orders. The results were comparable to those in 
5. Because of the lagged term, we estimated regressions for 1952-87.  Our coefficients (stan- 
dard errors) on the minimum wage variable and the lagged dependent variable for the models in 
table 6.3  are -  .  1  7 (  .06) and .45 (  .19); -  .I  3 (  .04) and .48 ( .  1  7); -  . 1  2 (  .OS) and .49 (  .17); -  .09 
(.04)  and .50 (.l6);  .30 (.13)  and .65 (.16); and .41 (.19) and .41 (.19). 186  Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
table 6.3, indicating that the finding of a substantial minimum wage effect is 
robust to the precise model used to analyze the data. Rather than giving all 
our specifications, we present the time-series data in appendix A, which read- 
ers can manipulate as they desire.6 
The short-run elasticities  of  employment to the  minimum  in table  6.3, 
while modest in magnitude, suggest that Puerto Rico experienced massive job 
losses as a result of the application of the U.S. minimum to the island. This is 
because the minimum is so high relative to average earnings in Puerto Rico. 
In 1987, for example, the coverage-weighted minimudmanufacturing earn- 
ings in table 6.1 were 0.63 In points higher in Puerto Rico than in the United 
States,  and  a Kaitz  index of  the minimum for Puerto Rico comparable  to 
the U.S. Kaitz  index was 0.64 In  points higher in Puerto Rico than in the 
United States.’ A 0.64 In difference in the minimum implies that, even with 
relatively modest elasticities, island employment would have been 9 percent 
higher in 1987 than if the minimum was at the same level relative to pay as in 
the United States. For the period  1973-87,  our analysis suggests that the in- 
creased minimum in Puerto Rico reduced the employment-population ratio by 
roughly 0.02 points, accounting for over one-third of  the 0.052 point actual 
drop.  * 
Turning to the unemployment results in table 6.3, economic theory has no 
prediction  about the effects of the minimum wage on unemployment rates. 
Some workers displaced by  the minimum may leave the work force (in the 
case of Puerto Rico, they may leave the island), while others may be attracted 
to the labor force by the higher pay-and  our regressions show correspond- 
ingly weaker effects on unemployment rates than on employment-population 
rates.  Still, given the magnitude of the minimum in Puerto Rico, the point 
estimates imply that the minimum raised the unemployment rate substantially. 
A 0.63 In point increase in the Kaitz measure of the minimum, for example, 
6. In one analysis,  we entered the In  of the minimum, coverage, and average earnings sepa- 
rately and obtained the following coefficients (standard errors): -  .12 (.09)  on In minimum; -  .  10 
(.07) on In coverage; and -  .  10 (.20)  on In average earnings. That the In minimum and In coverage 
have similar coefficients supports the restriction of entering them together in the equation. The 
insignificant coefficient on average earnings suggests that it plays little role in the results. In an- 
other analysis, we estimated the effects of the minimum for the period prior to imposition of the 
U.S.  minimum, 1951-73,  and the period when island minima began moving toward the federal 
level, from 1974 to 1987. The result was a large significant coefficient in the latter period but an 
insignificant coefficient in the former. 
7. The U.S. Kaitz  index  relates  to  nonagricultural  private  wage  and  salary  employment, 
whereas our measure for Puerto Rico was based on total employment. Accordingly, we estimated 
a Kaitz index for Puerto Rico based solely on private nonagricultural wage and salary workers in 
Puerto Rico. 
8.  Specifically, we multiply the 0.64 difference in the Kaitz minimum wage variable by  the 
0.15 coefficient in col. 1 and get a 0.096 In point reduction in the employment-population rate. 
With  a  1987  employment-population  rate  in  Puerto  Rico  of  0.369,  this  produces  a  0.406 
employment-population rate, for a 10  percent increase in employment. Similarly, the -  0.11 coef- 
ficient in col. 2 yields an estimated reduction in the employment rate of 0.07 In  points, for a 7 
percent increase in employment. 187  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
would have raised the rate of unemployment by 3 percentage points, accord- 
ing to the coefficient in column 5. 
Note finally that, if  workers displaced by the minimum were more likely 
than other workers to migrate to the United States, the table 6.3 employment 
and unemployment  effects understate the full effect of the minimum in dis- 
placing  labor.  This  is  because  they  are  based  solely on  the  population  in 
Puerto Rico rather than on the larger number of persons who would have been 
on the island and unemployed absent the migration option. 
6.2.1  Cross-Industry/Time-Series Analyses 
The existence  of  separate  minima  by  industry  in  Puerto  Rico  from  the 
1950s through  1983, and the corresponding differential increase of industry 
minima to the U.S. rate, offers an alternative to the standard time-series mode 
of estimating  the effect of minimum wages on employment.  It allows us to 
assess the effects of the minimum wage by contrasting changes in employment 
among industries  as their minima moved  toward  the federal level. For this 
analysis, we created a cross-industry time-series data set for Puerto Rico from 
1956 to 1987 by matching employment and earnings data for forty-two indus- 
tries that cover the entire economy,  save agriculture and g~vernment,~  with 
minimum wages from the industry reports of the U.S. Department of Labor 
(“Minimum  Wage  Industry  Studies”)  and  with  industry  coverage from  the 
U.S.  Department of Commerce (1979, table 1, 2:634). With forty-two indus- 
tries and thirty-one years (we excluded 1982 as there was no Survey of Man- 
ufacturing conducted in Puerto Rico in that year), we have a sample of 1,302 
observations that provides a stronger test of the hypothesis that the minimum 
affected employment than thirty-one time-series observations. 
We use the pooled cross-industrykime-series data set to estimate the effect 
of minimum wages on employment in an analysis of covariance framework: 
(1)  In  EMP,,  = a + b ln(c,, x  m,,/w,,)  + T, + IND, + u,,, 
where T,  is a vector of year dummy variables to control for cyclical or trend 
factors that influence employment, and IND, is an industry dummy variable to 
control for the scale of employment in an industry, and uI,  is the error term. 
The pooled cross-industryhime-series analysis differs from the time-series 
analysis in several ways beyond  sample size. It allows us to enter separate 
year and industry dummies and thus isolate the within-industry within-year 
variation in variables that is generally more difficult to explain than pure time- 
series variation. It also permits us to separate our analysis between the period 
when minima were set by the industry councils and the period when the Con- 
gress mandated changes in the minimum and thus to test for the potentially 
9. We use data for thirty-seven detailed manufacturing industries from the Puerto Rican Survey 
of Manufacturing and for five one-digit nonmanufacturing industries from the Departamento del 
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greater employment  effects under the latter regime.  With output terms ex- 
cluded  from the equation, moreover,  the minimum  will capture changes in 
employment due to minimum  wage-induced  changes  in industry output as 
well as those due to minimum  wage-induced  changes in employment  with 
output (level of demand) fixed. And by focusing on employment by industry, 
the analysis captures the movement of workers from industries with large in- 
creases in minimum wages to those with small increases as well as from em- 
ployment to nonemployment.  The latter two considerations suggest that em- 
ployment effects from the cross-industry analysis will exceed those from the 
aggregate time-series analysis. 
Table 6.4 presents  the regression  coefficients and standard errors on the 
minimum wage variables from our industry analysis for the entire period and 
for the subperiods 1956-73  and 1974-87.  The estimates strongly confirm the 
proposition  that minimum wage substantially affected employment in Puerto 
Rico. In column  1, the minimudaverage times coverage variable obtains a 
negative significant coefficient of 0.54, more than four times its standard er- 
ror. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 show that the effect of  the minimum 
occurs entirely in the period after the 1974 Amendment imposed increases in 
minima toward  the U.S. federal level.  The elasticity of  employment to the 
minimum is  -0.91  after 1974, compared to an estimated 0.20 elasticity be- 
fore 1974. This suggests that the industry councils took seriously the mandate 
to  set  minima  so that  they  “would  not  substantially  curtail  employment,” 
whereas the congressionally mandated changes were, of course, exogenous to 
the economic conditions on the island. 
Underlying the sizable minimum wage effects in table 6.4 is a substantial 
Table 6.4  Regression Coefficients (standard errors) for the Effect of the 
Minimum Wage and Other Variables on Ln Employment-Population, 
1951-87,  and on Ln Employment by Industry, 1956-87 
Cross Industry 
1956-87  1956-73  1974-87 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Minimum  -  .54  .20  -  .91 
Industry dummies  41  41  41 
Year dummies  30  17  12 
Sample size  1,302  756  546 
R2  .87  .95  .95 
~13)  (.I21  (  ,241 
Source: Estimated by  authors from a data set available on disk from the NBER. The detailed 
industry data for Puerto Rico are obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor’s “Minimum Wage 
Industry Studies” and the Departamento del Trabajo’s “Seria historica del empleo, despempleo y 
grupo trabajador in Puerto Rico.” 
Note: Minimum is the multiplicand of coverage for industry times minimudhourly earnings in 
industry. Figures exclude  1982 owing to the absence of  the Puerto Rican Survey of Manufactur- 
ing. The regressions cover forty-two industries, with agriculture and government excluded. 189  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
reallocation of Puerto Rican workers from low-wage industries that increased 
their minima greatly to reach U.S.  standards to high-wage industries that re- 
quired only modestly higher minima to reach the federal level. In industries at 
the U.S.  minimum  in  1973, employment grew by  1 percent  from  1974 to 
1983. In industries whose minimum was within $0.10 of the U.S. minimum 
in  1973, employment increased by  2 percent  over the same period.  But in 
industries whose  1973 minimum was more than $0.10 below the U.S. mini- 
mum and that therefore had to raise minima substantially to reach the U.S. 
level, employment dropped by 32 percent from 1974 to 1983! These calcula- 
tions  indicate that the  U. S.  -level  minimum  reallocated  employment  on the 
island as well as reducing the total employment-population rate. They show 
that a major reason for the higher elasticities of employment to the minimum 
in table 6.4  than in table 6.3 is the movement of workers across industries. 
6.3  The Minimum Wage and Migration 
Since Puerto  Ricans  face no  legal  restrictions  migrating  to the  United 
States, migration  depends on  the  incentives  facing  individuals,  including 
those that result from the minimum wage. Changes in the minimum can affect 
both the volume and the composition of migration. Economic analysis has no 
clear prediction about how the volume of migration  might respond to higher 
minimum  wages. Workers will be more likely to migrate if  they are disem- 
ployed by the minimum than if they hold jobs at below-minimum wages, but 
workers  whose  earnings  are  increased by  the  minimum  will  be  less likely 
to migrate.  The net effect of the minimum  on the size of the  migrant flow 
will depend on the number of workers in the two groups and their response 
to  the  minimum  wage-induced  change  in  their  conditions. lo  Economics 
does, however, predict how the minimum will affect the composition of  mi- 
grants.  Since employers are likely to lay off  or forgo hiring the least skilled 
workers when wages rise, the minimum  should induce greater migration  of 
the less skilled. 
6.3.1  Volume of Migration 
Puerto Rican  migration to the United  States has been immense.  In  1980, 
one-third of 20-64-year-old  persons born in Puerto Rico resided in the United 
States (Ramos, in this volume, table 2.1). Although there are no administra- 
tive statistics on migration from Puerto Rico, data from the U.S. and Puerto 
Rican  Censuses of  Population  and CPSs and passenger  travel records show 
sizable changes in the volume of migration over time.  In the  1950s, massive 
10. If, in accord with our estimates in sec. 6.2,  the elasticity of  demand to the minimum is 
below one, expected earnings of  all workers will be higher under the minimum. This does not, 
however, imply that the minimum reduces migrant flows. for workers who suffer the loss of jobs 
but do not gain the benefits of  higher wages may respond more to their condition than those who 
obtain modest gains in wages. Moreover, the elasticity is based on total employment, including 
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migration from Puerto Rico more than doubled the share of  the Puerto Rico 
born living  in the  United  States (see table 6.5). For the  next two decades, 
migration  rates fell, seemingly stabilizing the share of the Puerto Rico born 
on the mainland, only to surge once more in the 1980s. Figure 6.2 graphs the 
only available  measure of  annual migrant flows-net  passengers journeying 
from the island-relative  to the population on Puerto Rico, revealing further 
fluctuation in flows from year to year. From 195  1 to 1987, migration averaged 
0.9 percent of  the island population, with a standard deviation of 0.9. In the 
1950s, 1.9 percent of  the island population  left annually; in  the  1960s, 0.5 
percent; in the 1970s, 0.3  percent; and in the 1980s, 1.0 percent. 
To  see if the swing in migration  is related to the minimum wage,  we  re- 
gressed the ratio of  net migrants to the Puerto Rican population  (MIG) on the 
Kaitz measure of  the minimum, economic conditions in the United States and 
Puerto Rico, and the proportion of  the Puerto Rico born living in the United 
States in the previous year (PRUS),  using various measures of  economic con- 
ditions and  specifications.  In  nearly  all cases, the  minimum  variable  had  a 
statistically insignificant effect on the volume of migration. For example, con- 
trolling for GNP in Puerto Rico and the United States, we obtained 
MIG=  -.14+.07  log USGNP-  .05 log PRGNP+  ,005 log MIN-.~~  PRUS 
(.02)  (.oa  (.01)  (.05) 
R2 = .57 (standard errors in parentheses). 
Here, the coefficient on the minimum  wage implies that the 0.64 In  point 
lower minimum that would make it comparable to the minimum on the main- 
land relative to average earnings would reduce migration by 0.3  percent of the 
population, but the standard error is too high to place any confidence in this 
estimate. One interpretation of the high standard error is that the emigration- 
Table 6.5  Migration from Puerto Rico, 1950-87 
Puerto Rico.  Puerto Ricans  ’3  Puerto Ricans 
Total Population  Living in U.S.  in U.S. (2)/ 
(I ,000s)  (I  ,000s)  (1  +2) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
1950  2,203  226  ,093 
I960  2,339  617  ,209 
1970  2.659  810  ,233 
198@  2,889  93 I  ,244 
1987  3.294  1.155  ,260 
Sources: “Puerto Ricans  in  the U.S.” (1950, 1960,  1970); “Characteristics of  the  Population: 
Puerto Rico” (1950, 1960. 1970, 1980): “General Social and Economic Characteristics” (1980, 
table  167); Junta de Planificacion, “Informe economico al gobernador,” various eds.; Centro de 
Estudios de Puertoriquenos (1979, table 9, p. 187). 
Note: The number of Puerto Ricans living in the United States in 1987 IS estimated by summing 
annual net passenger flows from 198  1 to 1987 and adding half the 1980 flow. The flows are from 
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3.54 
years 
Fig. 6.2  Percentage of Puerto Ricans who migrated to the United States 
inducing  effect  of  the  minimum  through  disemploying  workers  and  the 
emigration-reducing  effect  of  the  minimum  through  raising  wages roughly 
balance out. Another interpretation is that the minimum has a nonnegligible 
effect on migration that cannot be reliably  detected in the fluctuating time- 
series  data.  While econometric  manipulations  that  smooth  the  data  might 
yield better estimates of the effect of  the minimum,Il  we believe that there is 
no convincing story about the volume of migration in the time series and turn 
instead to micro survey data on how the minimum may have influenced the 
characteristics of  migrants. 
6.3.2  Premigration Employment Experience of Migrants 
Economic analysis predicts that workers displaced by the minimum should 
be more likely to leave the island than others and, given the higher capital/ 
labor ratios in the United States, should have greater success finding jobs in 
the United States than in Puerto Rico. Consistent with this, Puerto Rican male 
and  female  migrants  have  much  higher  employment-population  rates  than 
Puerto Rican residents with  the same years of  schooling (cols.  1-2  of  table 
6.6). However,  because these data do not tell  us how migrants fared when 
they were in Puerto Rico, they leave open the possibility that migrants actu- 
ally came largely from the ranks of the employed. To determine the employ- 
ment experience of  migrants prior to emigration,  we turned to the  1982-83 
“Encuesta de migracion” of the Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico (1984). 
The encuesta asked migrants at the international airport their employment sta- 
tus during the previous three months. Because migrants are younger than typ- 
11.  Santiago (1990) estimates a complex model with monthly flows that suggests that the min- 
imum raised migration, but he has no other control variables, and his raw correlations give the 
opposite result. We interpret this as indicating the difficulty of making inferences from these data. 192  Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 6.6  Percentage Employed of Puerto Rico-born Men and Women, by  Year 
of Schooling and Migrant Status, 1980 and 1983 
Males 
1980  1983 
Migrants to U.S. 
Years of  In Puerto Rico  3 Months before 
Schooling  In Puerto Rico  In U.S.  (adjusted for age)  Migration 
56  39  64  32 
7-9  49  68  40 
10-1  I  55  72  52 
12  67  81  60 
13-15  71  84  71 
16+  87  85  79 









56  10  22  7  5 
7-9  17  26  14  11 
1c-I  1  21  31  13  5 
12  38  46  34  21 
13-15  55  56  46  32 
16f  72  61  67  55 
All  28  33  29  20 
Sources: 1980, tabulated from the Public Use Files of the U.S. and Puerto Rico Censuses. 1983, 
tabulated from the Puerto Rican CPS. 1983 migrants, tabulated from the Junta de Planificacion 
de Puerto Rico (October 1984), tables 12, 14, and A7. 
Note: The'1983 rates are weighted by  the age distribution of  migrants from the Junta de Planifi- 
cacion de Puerto Rico (October 1984), using table A-5 for weights. The same age weights were 
used for both sexes. 
ical island residents, we contrasted migrant employment rates with a weighted 
average of age-specific employment rates of  residents, using the age distribu- 
tion of  migrants  as weights.  Further, to avoid  problems due to changes in 
island  employment  over time or between  surveys  and Censuses,12 we con- 
trasted these rates with 1983 employment rates from the Puerto Rican CPS. 
The results of these comparisons show that the percentage of  migrants em- 
ployed is markedly below the percentage of island residents employed in the 
same education-sex  group (cols. 3 and 4 of  table 6.6).  In the aggregate,  38 
percent  of  male migrants  were employed, compared to  55 percent  of male 
residents. Given the numbers of residents and migrants, this implies that ap- 
proximately 4.4 percent of employed males and 7.5 percent of jobless males 
12. The U.S. Department of Commerce (1979, 2:601) noted substantial differences between 
Census and CPS estimates of unemployment rates. The revisions in annual employment and pop- 
ulation estimates  after the  1980 Census  benchmark was introduced also imply  inconsistencies 
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migrated. Among women, the pattern is weaker, presumably because women 
are “tied movers” (Mincer 1976): 20 percent of migrants worked, compared 
to 29 percent  of residents,  giving rates of migration of 2.6 percent for the 
employed and 3.7 percent for the not employed.I3  The encuesra also asked 
why individuals were migrating. Consistent with the notion that lack of work 
induced considerable  migration,  the  vast majority of  migrants exclusive of 
military  personnel  and students  said that they were migrating  to work (33 
percent) or to search for work (47 percent) (Junta de Planificacion  1984, table 
A- 18). Less-educated and younger persons were especially likely to be mov- 
ing to search for work. 
6.3.3 
Ramos (in this volume) has shown that male Puerto Rican migrants to the 
United States had fewer years of schooling than similarly aged nonmigrants 
in 1980, which he attributes to the higher payoff to education in Puerto Rico. 
Since the minimum will disproportionately  reduce  the employment of less- 
educated workers,  this pattern is also consistent with the minimum wage in- 
fluencing the characteristics of migrants.  To  try to identify a separate mini- 
mum wage effect, we compared the education of migrants to that of residents 
in Puerto Rico in earlier Censuses. If migrants had less schooling than non- 
migrants  in periods  when the minimum  was weak,  we would  be loathe to 
ascribe much of the 1980 census pattern to the minimum wage. By contrast, 
evidence that the migrant-nonmigrant schooling gap developed when the min- 
imum increased would lend support to the hypothesis that the minimum influ- 
enced the educational composition of migrants. 
Published Census data on the median years of  schooling of Puerto Rican 
migrants and of residents on the island aged 25 years and older in 1950, 1960, 
and 197014 showed the opposite pattern of relative attainment to that for 1980. 
In 1950, when relatively few Puerto Ricans had migrated to the United States, 
migrants had 7.7 years of school completed, compared to 3.7 years for per- 
sons on the island. In 1960, migrants completed 7.9 years of schooling, non- 
migrants 4.6 years.  In  1970, migrants  had  8.4  years  and nonmigrants  6.9 
years completed-a  smaller but still substantial gap that implies that as late 
as 1970 the bulk of  Puerto Rican migrants were more educated than nonmi- 
grants. Not until the 1980 Census do migrants have less education than non- 
Years of Schooling of Migrants 
13.  The encuesfa estimated that there were 59,000 male and 37,000 female migrants aged 16- 
64 in 1983. The Puerto Rican CPS suggests that there were approximately 501 ,000 employed men 
and 479,000 not employed men on the island aged 16-64. There were 294,000 employed women 
and 806,000 not employed women. We  used these data to estimate the rate of migration of em- 
ployed and not employed men and women from Puerto Rico, unadjusted for the age of migrants. 
14.  The figures for the Puerto Rico born living in the United States are taken from the special 
Census volume on “Puerto Ricans Living in the  U.S.” in  1950, 1960, and  1970. The figures for 
residents in Puerto Rico come from the Puerto Rico volumes of the Census. The Census canceled 
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migrants, consistent with the contention that movement toward the U.S. in the 
1970s altered the selectivity of migration. 
To  explore the  1970-80  change in migrant-nonmigrant education differ- 
ences further, we estimated equations for years of  schooling from the Public 
Use Files of  the  1970 and  198015 U.S. and Puerto Rican Censuses and the 
June 1988 U.S. and Puerto Rican CPSs. Building on Ramos’s analysis of the 
1980 Census,  we  pooled  the  records  of  16-64-year-old  persons  born  in 
Puerto Rico and residing in the United States with those of  Puerto Ricans 
living in Puerto Rico. We  regressed years of  school completed on dummy 
variables for age (to control for the upward trend in schooling), migrant status, 
and (in 1970 and 1980) a “recent migrant” dummy that takes the value of one 
if  the person migrated to the United States in the preceding five years. 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors on the migrant dummy vari- 
ables are given in table 6.7. The coefficient in the 1980 regression for males 
corroborates Ramos’s finding that migrant men had fewer years of schooling 
than resident of Puerto Rico. The coefficient in the 1988 regression is smaller 
but still negative. By contrast, the coefficient in the 1970 regressions for males 
show migrants having fewer years of schooling than island residents. The re- 
gressions for females tell a similar story: migrants had less education than 
nonmigrants in 1980 and 1988 but more education than nonmigrants in 1970. 
In  1980 and  1988, moreover, migrant-nonmigrant educational differentials 
were greater for women than for men, possibly because the minimum affects 
the employment of  female workers more than that of male workers owing to 
the lower wages of women. 
The regressions that distinguish between recent and earlier migrants tell a 
more complex story. The estimated coefficients on recent migrants are nega- 
tive in the 1970 Census as well as in the 1980 Census and are absolutely larger 
in the 1970 Census as well. This implies that 1965-70  migrants were dispro- 
portionately drawn from less-educated Puerto Ricans,  whereas  those  who 
came earlier were drawn from the more educated. If the 1965-70  migration of 
the less educated was due to the minimum wage, we would expect a sharp rise 
in  the  minimum  in  1965-70.  Table  6.1 above  shows  such  a  rise  in  the 
coverage-weighted minimum in Puerto Rico due to the 1965 Amendment to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. While this does not prove that the increased 
migration of the less educated in 1965-70  is due to the minimum, it is con- 
sistent with the minimum wage contributing to the change. 
15. For Puerto Ricans in  the United States in  1970, we used the  1/100 sample of the U.S. 
Census; for Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico in 1970, the l/lOO sample of  the Puerto Rican Census 
was used; for Puerto Ricans in the United States in 1980, we used a sample derived by combining 
the lil00 sample with the 5/100 sample from selected states with many Puerto Ricans. The sample 
represents 90 percent of the total Puerto Rico born population in the United States. For details, 
see Ramos (in this volume).  The sample of  Puerto Ricans residing in Puerto Rico is extracted 
from the 5/1OO Census for Puerto Rico. We included all out-of-school persons not in the military 
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Table 6.7  Estimated Coefficients (standard errors) for Differences in Years of 
Schooling Completed by Puerto Rican Migrants to the United States 
and Puerto Ricans on the Island, 1970-88 
Males 
1988186  1980  1970  1980  1970 
Migrants  -  .35  -  .53  .18 
(.25)  (45)  (. 10) 
Recent migrants  -  .34  -  .66 
(. 14)  (  .24) 
Earlier migrants  -  .55  .32 
(.W  (. 10) 
Dummies for age  9  9  9  9  9 
R2  .06  .07  .08  .07  .08 
N  5,442  56,809  18,850  55,809  18,850 
Females 
Migrants  -  .76  -  .70  .23 
( ,201  (.W  (.W 
Recent migrants  -  .65  .57 
.05  (.22) 
Earlier migrants  -  .70  .37 
(.09) 
Dummies for age  9  9  9  9  9 
R‘  .13  .15  .12  .I5  .I2 
N  6,451  63,561  20,921  63,561  20,921 
Sources:  1970 and 1980 tabulated from the Public Use Files of the U.S. and Puerto Rican Cen- 
suses. 1988 tabulated from the June 1988 Puerto Rican CPS, with migrants from June 1988 and 
1986 from the US.  CPS. 
We examined the changed selectivity of migrants by education between the 
1970 and the 1980 Censuses in one additional way. We  used the two Censuses 
to calculate the average years of schooling of the Puerto Rico born in Puerto 
Rico and in the United States in  specified “pseudocohorts”-persons  aged y 
years in  1970 and y  + 10 years in  1980. Figure 6.3  displays the results of 
this analysis in terms of the change in years of schooling completed by pseu- 
docohorts on the island and in the United States. It shows greater increases in 
years completed for cohorts in  Puerto Rico than for cohorts in the United 
States, implying a substantial sorting of  the Puerto Rico born in a given co- 
hort, with the less educated moving to the United States and the more edu- 
cated returning to Puerto Rico. This is what one would expect if  the move- 
ment toward the U.S.-level minimum in the 1970s made it more difficult for 
the less educated to find work on the island. 
An  alternative explanation of  why migrants had  less schooling than non- 
migrants in the  1980s but not in the 1970s is that the rewards to  education 196  Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
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Fig. 6.3  Change in mean years of schooling completed by cohort and 
residence, Puerto Rico-born  men, 1970-80 
increased from 1970 to 1980 in Puerto Rico relative to the United States. We 
examined this possibility for male workers by  estimating log earnings equa- 
tions for men in Puerto Rico and for migrants to the United States in 1970 and 
1980 for both annual and hourly eamings.I6 Our model included years of  po- 
tential work experience dummy variables and a linear years of schooling term 
(all the regressions are in app. B). For Puerto Rico-born  men  in the United 
States, the regressions for weekly earnings gave a coefficient on schooling of 
0.048 in 1970 and 0.036 in 1980, for a 0.012 drop in the effect of schooling 
on earnings. By contrast, the regressions for Puerto Ricans on the island gave 
a coefficient on schooling of 0.071 in 1970 and 0.077 in 1980, for a 0.006 rise 
in the effect of  schooling on earnings. These results suggest that changes in 
the returns to schooling contributed to the changed educational selectivity of 
migrants in the decade and thus buttress Ramos’s story. The regressions for 
yearly earnings showed a 0.010 fall in the effect of  schooling on the earnings 
of migrants, compared to a 0.018 rise in the effect of schooling on the island. 
Since yearly and weekly earnings differ by  weeks worked, the implication is 
that the effect of  schooling on weeks worked increased by  just 0.002 among 
migrants but  by  0.012 among  island residents. This is consistent with the 
notion that the minimum wage altered the selectivity of migrants by  reducing 
the employment of the less educated more than of the educated. Thus, there is 
evidence that both joblessness due to the increased minimum wage and edu- 
16. The 1970 Censuses did not ask for usual hours worked, so our analysis is based on infor- 
mation on hours worked last week. In addition, the Public Use tapes present time-worked data in 
categories rather than in actual values; we used category midoointg in our analysis. 197  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
cational pay  differentials  contributed  to the greater immigration of  the less 
educated to the United States in the 1970s. 
6.3.4  Migration, Education, and Language 
Another way to examine how the minimum wage might affect migration is 
to contrast the likelihood of migration  among workers more or less likely to 
be affected by the minimum. We have done this using education as an indica- 
tor of being affected by the minimum. For six education groups, we used 1980 
Puerto Rican Census data to estimate the proportion of  workers likely to be 
affected by the minimum had they resided in Puerto Rico; we also used pooled 
U.S.  and Puerto Rican  1980 Census data to estimate the proportion  of  the 
Puerto Rico born residing in the United States. 
There is no easy way to assess the proportion of  workers affected by the 
minimum  (PMIN). The distribution of earnings from the  1980 Puerto Rican 
Census shows the proportion earning the minimum or less, but not the number 
of  persons who lost their jobs or who migrated  as a result of  the minimum, 
and thus understates the proportion affected by the minimum. The understate- 
ment will,  moreover,  be greater for groups whose employment  is most re- 
duced  and/or  who  migrate  in  large  numbers,  biasing  the  estimates  against 
finding a minimum wage effect on those outcomes. Still, as the Census earn- 
ings distribution offers the only direct indicator of PMIN, we used it to compute 
the proportions of Puerto Ricans in different education groups with earnings 
at or below the $2.90 U.S. minimum. Column 1 of table 6.8 shows that these 
proportions decline with education steeply after high school. 
To  estimate the proportion of the Puerto Rico born who were migrants in 
our six educatibn groups, we regressed a zero-one variable for U.S. residence 
on dummy variables for years of schooling groups and for ten age groups in 
our pooled U.S. and Puerto Rican census file. The coefficients on the school- 
ing dummies, given in columns 2 and 3 of table 6.8, reveal a nonlinear rela- 
tion between years of schooling and migration that was hidden in the compar- 
ison  of  mean  education  of  migrants  and  nonmigrants:  the  probability  of 
migration  is  smallest for the least educated  and  for the most  educated and 
highest  for those  who  graduate  grade  school  but  do not  go beyond  high 
school.  The limited migration of  the least educated-who  are the most  af- 
fected by the minimum, who have the lowest employment rates, and who have 
the smallest rewards from schooling-appears  to be due to their lack of spo- 
ken English (and/or lack of information related to the possession of that lan- 
guage skill). Of men with zero to six years of  schooling, only 13 percent of 
those in Puerto Rico could speak English, compared to 31 percent  of  those 
17.  As an alternative estimate of  PMIN, we assumed that the 1969 earnings distribution given 
in the 1970 Census would have held in 1979 absent the minimum wage, inflated 1969 earnings by 
the rate of growth of  average hourly earnings in manufacturing, and estimated the proportion of 
workers by education in the inflated distribution likely to be paid the 1979 U.S. minimum or less. 
The results were sufficiently similar to those in the text that we forgo presenting them. 198  AIida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 6.8  Estimated Proportions of Workers Subject to the Minimum in Puerto 
Rico and Migrant Status 
Proportion Paid Minimum 
or  Below or 
Proportion of Migrants, 1980 
Not  Employed  Adjusted for 
Education  Not Adjusted  Language 
0-6 
7-8 
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.I1  .04 
.I9  .02 
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Source: Column  1 estimated from regressions in appendix C, using 1980 Puerto Rican Census. 
Column 2 estimated from regressions  in appendix C, using  1980 Puerto Rican and U.S.  Cen- 
suses. Column 3 estimated from regressions in appendix C, using  1980 Puerto Rican and U.S. 
Censuses, with inclusion of dummy variable for English-speaking proficiency. 
with seven to eight years of schooling, 59 percent of  high school graduates, 
and 92 p'ercent of college graduates. Even among migrants there was a marked 
difference in the ability to speak English: 47 percent of  migrants with zero to 
six years of schooling reported speaking English well, compared to 58 percent 
of migrants with seven to eight years of schooling, 96 percent of high school 
graduates, and 99 percent of college graduates.I8 Since persons with the least 
English-speaking ability are unlikely to migrate, language skill is an omitted 
variable associated with education that depresses the migration of the less ed- 
ucated. Adding dummy variables for ability to speak English to our migrant 
regression  turns  the  inverse  U-shaped  education-migration  relation  into  a 
monotonic relation in column 3 of  table 6.8. As  migrants improve their En- 
glish,  the  estimated  effect of  English  speaking on migration  to the  United 
States will be biased upward, which will in turn bias the estimated coefficients 
on education groups in the migration  regression, but this bias is unlikely  to 
18.  These calculations are based on questions on English-speaking ability asked in  both the 
U.S. and the Puerto Rican Censuses. The U.S. Census had a fourfold categorization: speaking 
English very well, well, not well, and not at all. The Puerto Rican Census had a threefold cate- 
gorization: speaking English easily, with difficulty, and not at all. We collapsed the speaking very 
well and the speaking well categorizations in the U.S. Census so that we had comparable three- 
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account for the elimination of the inverse U-shaped education-migration rela- 
tion on addition of the English-speaking variable to our regression.  l9 
The correlations  between  PMIN and the adjusted or unadjusted  proportion 
migrating are high. For men, the correlations are 0.99 with the adjusted pro- 
portion migrating and 0.77 with the unadjusted proportion.  For women, the 
correlations  are  .99 with the proportion  of migrants corrected for language 
and .84 with the proportion of migrants absent the language adjustment. Still, 
since those most affected by the minimum have lower wages,  it is possible 
that the correlation between PMIN and the proportion of migrants by education 
group is due not to the minimum but to differences in earnings by education 
group. To assess this possibility, we calculated employment rates and earnings 
by schooling group for workers on the island and for migrants to the United 
States. Figure 6.4 shows that in differences in weekly earnings between mi- 
grants and nonmigrants fell sharply with education, consistent with the earn- 
ings differential explanation of  the greater migration  of the less educated.  It 
also shows that In differences in employment rates between migrants and non- 
migrants fell with education, consistent with the minimum wage/joblessness 
interpretation of the greater migration of the less educated. With both factors 
working in the same direction, it is difficult to assess their relative importance. 
In any case, the result is that persons with the skills likely to make them af- 
fected by the minimum dominated the 1970s migrant 
6.4  Effects of Migration on the Puerto Rican Job Market 
We argue next that, regardless of the causal effect of the minimum wage on 
Puerto Rican migration, migration has been a key “safety valve” in the Puerto 
Rican job market without which it would have been virtually  impossible to 
impose the U.S .-level minimum on the island. Migration reduced joblessness, 
raised the average  skills of workers and the marginal productivity  of labor, 
and contributed to the growth of real earnings on the island. 
19.  In the underlying data, the zero to six years of schooling group has a lower proportion in 
the United States than the seven to eight years of schooling group, but it has a higher proportion 
in the United States for those who speak English well,  who speak English somewhat, and for 
those who do not speak English. To  see if this pattern might be due to those in the United States 
learning English, we estimated migration status equations comparable to those in app. C for recent 
migrants, who have  less time to improve their English proficiency. In  our regressions (which 
eliminated pre-1975 migrants from the sample), we obtained results similar to those for all mi- 
grants: additional of  English-speaking dummies explained the low migration rate among the zero 
to six years of schooling group. 
20.  If the minimum wage induced the less qualified to migrate, we would expect migrants to 
do especially poorly in the U.S. labor market conditional on education. Ramos has shown that, in 
1980, migrant males, particularly the most recent migrants, had lower earnings than otherwise 
comparable to U.S.-born F’uerto Ricans. We estimated log earnings equations for apooled sample 
of U.S.-born  Puerto Ricans and migrants in  1970 and found a smaller effect for all migrants in 
1970 than in  1980, but we found equally large gaps between the earnings of recent migrants and 
those of U.S.-born F’uerto  Ricans in 1970 as in 1980. 200  Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
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Fig. 6.4  Log difference of  employment to population and earnings by 
education group, migrants to Puerto Ricans 
6.4.1 
What might the employment-population  rate and unemployment rate have 
been in Puerto Rico with a U.S.-level minimum wage but no outlet for migra- 
tion? 
Consider first the potential labor market effects of imposing the U.S. mini- 
mum in the 1970s and 1980s if no Puerto Rican migrated to the United States 
after 1974. In this case, there would have been approximately  232,000 addi- 
tional persons of  working age on the island,21  increasing the working-age pop- 
Migration and Joblessness in the Presence of the Minimum 
21.  This estimate is the sum of  approximately 90,000 net migrants from 1975 through early 
1980 (based on the 1980 Census of Population) and 200.000 net migrants from passenger traffic 201  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
ulation by about 10 percent. If the number of jobs for the less skilled was fixed 
because the minimum disallowed employment-creating movements down the 
demand curve, all migrants whose characteristics would have earned them less 
than the minimum as well as those with characteristics that would have made 
them unemployed  would  have been jobless  on the  island. To  find out how 
many migrants would fit in this set, we estimated the effect of age and school- 
ing on the probability that someone in Puerto Rico would have been jobless 
or paid the minimum or less and applied the resultant equation to the charac- 
teristics of  recent migrants.  The calculation indicates that 77 percent of mi- 
grants would have been jobless on the island and just 23 percent employed.22 
Hence,  199,000 of  the 232,000 “return  migrants” would have lacked jobs, 
and just 53,000 would have found work. Assuming that the “return migrants” 
participated in the labor force at the same rate as they did in the United States 
(56 percent), the number of additional unemployed workers would be 69,000. 
Because the island employment-population rate was already low (.359), how- 
ever,  the  addition  of  these  workers  would  have  reduced  the  island 
employment-population  rate by only  .013, or 3 percent.  But, because there 
would have been more unemployed than employed return  migrants,  the un- 
employment rate would have risen by 4 percentage points, from 17 to 21 per- 
cent. Similar calculations  assuming  that return  migrants  would  have  found 
employment  at the  31 percent rate of employment of migrants in  the three 
months preceding migration given in the “Encuesta de migracion” suggest a 
substantial 3 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate, although only a 
0.5 percentage point fall in the employment-population rate on the island. 
6.4.2  Long-Run Migration 
How  might the Puerto Rican  labor market have fared in the entire post- 
World War I1 era if Puerto Ricans had never had the option of  migrating to the 
United  States? For  simplicity,  we  answer  this  question  assuming  that  all 
Puerto Rican migrants to the United States had remained residents of the is- 
land  and  that  other factors  that  determine  economic  well-being  were  un- 
changed on the island. As other factors would also have changed, our exercise 
should be viewed not as a prediction of  what might actually have happened 
but rather as a way to demonstrate the magnitude of the economic effects of 
immigration on the island. A full analysis of  what might have happened ab- 
sent migration requires a complete model of  the Puerto Rican economy that 
lies beyond the scope of this study. 
Absent migration from Puerto Rico to the United States, the one-third of 
data. This gives 290,000 migrants. On the basis of  1980 Census data, approximately 80 percent 
will be between age 16 and age 64, giving the 232,000 in the text. 
22.  We base this estimate on a two-stage analysis. First, we estimated separately for sex the 
relation between being employed at above-minimum wages in Puerto Rico in the  1980 Census 
and a set of education and age dummy variables. Then we predicted the proportion of recent 
migrants who would have been employed on the island, given that equation. The equations are 
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the Puerto Rico born of working age living in the United States would be on 
the island, raising the working-age population by about 50 percent, or 0.40 In 
points.  Assuming, as in our earlier  calculation for the  effects of  migration 
after 1974, that 70-80  percent of  these return migrants were jobless in the 
presence of a U.S .-level minimum wage even if island productivity remained 
unaffected  (i.e., if capital also increased by one-third or so) and that 56 per- 
cent would have been in the work force, the rate of unemployment would have 
risen to 30-35  percent.  This effect is so large as to call into question the as- 
sumption that the U.S.-level  minimum could have been applied to the island 
absent migration.  More likely than not, the result would have been similar to 
that in  1935, when Congress quickly rescinded the U.S.-level minimum and 
chose instead  the  industry-council  mode of  setting minima.  Put differently, 
massive  migration  to the United  States was  a prerequisite  for applying  the 
U.S. minimum to the island in the 1970s. 
What might have been the level of wages on the island absent migration and 
absent the minimum wage? If nothing else changed, labor supply would have 
been 0.40 In  points higher in  1980 than it was. Given an elasticity of  substi- 
tution of  u,  a fixed capital  stock, labor’s share of  output  of  a, and market 
clearing, a 0.40 In  point  increase  in  the  work  force  would  reduce  pay  by 
[u/(  1 - a)].40 In points.23  At any plausible levels of a and u,  the change in la- 
bor supply would have a devastating effect on real wages. For instance, with a 
Cobb-Douglas production function and labor’s share of two thirds of  GNP,24  a 
0.40 In point increase in labor supply would reduce average earnings by  1.2 
In  points, or to 30 percent of  their current level. Even with a relatively small 
elasticity of substitution of, say, 0.15, comparable to our estimated elasticity 
of  employment to the minimum wage, wages on the island would have been 
cut by 0.18 In points, to 84 percent of their current level. Of course, the econ- 
omy would  have  made other adjustments:  the return to  capital  would  have 
risen, inducing greater investment that would have partially restored the capi- 
tal/labor ratio; fertility might have fallen; investments in human capital might 
have risen; and so on. But the first-order effect of  massive return  migration 
would clearly fall on real wages. 
Given the lower education of migrants, moreover, there would be an addi- 
tional reduction in earnings and productivity due to the reduced qualifications 
of  the work force. If all the Puerto Rico born had remained on the island, the 
average education of the Puerto Rican work force would be roughly 0.3 years 
23.  With market clearing, the elasticity of substitution (u)  is (K‘ - L’) / (w’ - r‘). so that, 
with  fixed  capital  stock,  L’  = -  u(w’ - r’).  The  factor  price  frontier  equation  is 
aw’  + (1 - a)r’  = 0, where the price of output is the numeraire. Substituting for r’,  we obtain 
L  =  -a{w’  + [a/(  1 - a)]w’}, which simplifies toL = uw‘/(l - a), as in the text. 
24.  In 1980, compensation of  employees was $7,202 million, national  income  was $9,722 
million, and GNP was $11,031 million.  Thus,  labor’s share of  national  income was 0.74, or 
approximately three-quarters, while its share of GNP was .65, or approximately two-thirds (see 
Junta de Planificacion, “lnforme economico al gobernador,” 1981). In the 1950s. labor’s share of 
output was smaller owing to the greater importance of  agriculture. 203  Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum Wage on Puerto Rico 
lower,  implying that wages would have been  some 2 percent  less owing to 
educational qualifications. In addition, if  we follow Ramos and interpret the 
within-education  differential  in  earnings  between  migrants  and  U.S.-born 
Puerto Ricans as indicating the lower qualifications of migrants, we estimate 
that the earnings power of the return migrants would be  13 percent less than 
that of nonmigrants,  reducing  the productivity and earnings of  the average 
Puerto Rican by 4 percent. All told, even with a 0.15 elasticity of substitution, 
we estimate that, absent migration (and further capital investments), real earn- 
ings in Puerto Rico would conservatively be on the order of 25 percent lower 
in 1988 than in fact they were. The implication is that, at the minimum, one- 
quarter of the long-term trend in real earnings on the island (an increase of 
174 percent from 1951 to 1988) can be attributed to migration to the United 
States. 
6.5  Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the imposition of the U.S.-level minimum wage 
to Puerto Rico distorted the Puerto Rican earnings distribution, substantially 
reduced employment on the island, reallocated labor across industries,  and 
affected the characteristics of  migrants to the United States. In addition, we 
argued that, absent migration of  the less skilled, imposition of a U.S.-level 
minimum on the island would have raised unemployment so much as to call 
into question the viability of such a policy. Thus, migration was a prerequisite 
for the high minimum wage. Our estimates indicate further that migration was 
a major contributor to the growth of real earnings on the island. All told, the 
massive migration from Puerto Rico demonstrates both the interplay between 
domestic labor market policy-in  this case, imposition of a minimum wage 
with a bite-and  migration and the potential contribution of migration to the 
growth of real wages in a source economy. 
Appendix A 
Documentation for the Puerto Rican Minimum Wage 
Time-Series  Data Set 
Minimum Wage-Related  Variables 
Average minimum wages (AVEMIN) is a weighted average of forty-four in- 
dustry minimums (thirty-seven three-digit manufacturing and seven one-digit 
industries). The data were gathered from the individual U.S. Department of 
Labor reports (the “Minimum Wage Industry Studies”) that record the indus- 
try minimums in the years when industry committees set minima. The reports 
usually give minima for very detailed occupations. To  arrive at a single mini- 
mum wage for each industry, the data had to be amalgamated. Because em- 204  Alida J. Castillo-Freeman and Richard B. Freeman 
ployment  by  occupation  was unavailable,  we took  a simple average of  the 
occupational minimum. 
Average coverage (AVECOV)  is a weighted average of coverage for the eight 
one-digit  industries,  based  on  table  1  of  U.S. Department  of  Commerce 
(1979,  2:634).  All  three-digit  manufacturing  industries  are covered by  the 
same figure. The Department of  Commerce table gives the number of  wage 
and salary workers covered by the changes in the minimum wage law (in 1966 
and 1974). This number was divided by total employment in each industry to 
determine the effect of the minimum on the entire economy. Since the law 
changed in the middle of 1974, the coverage figure for that year is the average 
between the  1973 and the  1975 numbers. We  also created average coverage 
excluding agriculture and government (COVAG),  for wage and salary workers 
(AVENCOV), and for wage and salary workers excluding agriculture and gov- 
ernment (NCOVAG). 
Economy-wide coverage  (COVT)  is  based  on  coverage  figures for  1962, 
1964, 1965, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1975, and 1976 from U.S. De- 
partment of Labor, Employment Standards Administration (1977). For 1976, 
the figures are the same as in table 1 of U.S. Department of Commerce (1979, 
2:634). We  divided the figures by  total employment to obtain the coverage 
number. 
Average wage (AVEWAG)  is the weighted average of  the forty-four industry 
average hourly earnings. The thirty-seven detailed three-digit manufacturing 
earnings are from the Departamento del Trabajo’s “Census of Manufacturing 
Industries” (1956-87).  The Census was collected every October through 1981 
and then not again until March  1983, so there are no figures for 1982. In the 
time-series analysis, the  1982 figure is the average between  1981 and 1983. 
For the  years  1950-55,  the Census was not conducted,  so we  applied the 
change in one-digit manufacturing hourly earnings from each year to 1956 to 
the 1956 three-digit earnings, on the assumption that earnings in each detailed 
sector changed at the same rate as the average in manufacturing. The one-digit 
industry data were obtained  from the “Salario semanal mediano de 10s  em- 
pleados asalariados por grupo industrial principal” (Departamento del Trabajo 
y Recursos Humanos). This source gives weekly earnings by month. To make 
hourly earnings, we divided the July weekly earnings by thirty-two hours. 
Average manufacturing  wage (MFGWAG)  comes from the Yearbook of  La- 
bour Statistics ( 1950-87). 
Kaitz minimum wage index (KAITZ) is the employment-weighted average of 
coverage times minimudhourly earnings: 
where a, is the share of employment in industry i, m,  is the minimum in indus- 
try i, w, is average hourly earnings in industry i,  and c,  is the coverage in that 
industry. The index used the coverage, minimum, and hourly earnings figures 
described above. We also created a Kaitz index for wage and salary workers 
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The employment by industry numbers used in the weighting come from two 
sources. The individual manufacturing industry numbers are from the Depar- 
tamento del Trabajo’s “Census of Manufacturing Industries” for the three-digit 
manufacturing industries (1956-87).  To  get the  1950-55  numbers, we took 
the ratio of employment in all manufacturing in each of these years to employ- 
ment in  all manufacturing in  1956 and multiplied this by  the  1956 employ- 
ment in the detailed industry. For the remaining seven one-digit industries, the 
employment numbers are from the Departamento del Trabajo’s “Seria histo- 
rica del empleo, desempleo y grupo trabajador en Puerto Rico.” 
We used thirty-seven three-digit manufacturing industries: footwear, leather 
gloves, electrical, women’s and children’s clothing, children’s outerwear, cor- 
sets and brassieres, men’s and boy’s clothing, leather handbags, women’s out- 
erwear,  miscellaneous apparel,  miscellaneous fabricated  textiles,  toys  and 
athletic goods, jewels and jewelry, costume jewelry, office and art supplies, 
alcoholic beverages,  cigars,  tobacco,  drugs,  petroleum,  chemicals,  food, 
household furniture, other furniture, sawmills, paper and allied products, ce- 
ment, cut stone and asbestos, portland cement and pottery, glass, sugar, textile 
mill products, plastics, rubber, footwear, professional instruments, and ma- 
chinery and transportation equipment. 
We  used seven one-digit industries: transportation, construction, services, 
trades, finance, agriculture, and public administration. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Puerto Rican deflator (PRDEF)  is from the Junta de Planificacion’s “Informe 
economico a1 gobernador,” 1954 base year. 
Puerto Rican GNP (PRGNP)  is from the Junta de Planificacion’s “Informe 
economica al gobernador,” 1954 constant dollars. 
These series Puerto  Rican employment  to population  ratio  (PREFQP and 
PREPOPF) come from the monthly household surveys done in Puerto Rico. The 
PREFQP  series combines two series:  1950-63  uses the fiscal year fourteen 
years old and over, reported in the Departamento del Trabajo’s “Seria historica 
del empleo, desempleo y grupo trabajador en Puerto Rico” (table IV); 1964- 
87 uses the calendar year sixteen years old and over numbers from the Depart- 
mento del Trabajo’s “Empleo y disemployeo en Puerto Rico” (table 17), ad- 
justed to the 1980 Census benchmark. The PREPOPF series uses the fiscal year 
fourteen years old and over numbers for the entire time period, also adjusted 
to a 1980 Census benchmark. 
Puerto Rican unemployment rate (PRUNEMP)  is from the Departamento del 
Trabajo’s “Seria.historica del empleo, desempleo y grupo trabajador en Puerto 
Rico.” This series comes from the monthly household surveys done in Puerto 
Rico similar to our Current Population Survey. 
US.  GNP (USGNP)  is from the Economic Report of  the President. 
Table 6A. 1 gives figures for both the minimum wage-related  variables and 
the macroeconomic variables. Table 6A.l  Data in the Time-Series Analysis 
Minimum Wage-related  Variables  Macroeconomic Variables 
Year  AVEMIN  AVEWAGE  KAITZ  AVECOV  COVT  MFGWAGE  PRDEF  PREPOP  PREPOPF  PRGNP  PRUNEMP  USGNP  Year  Dummy 1974 
1950  ,198 
1951  ,209 
1952  ,225 
1953  .31  I 
1954  ,313 
I955  ,369 
I956  .447 
1957  .488 
1958  ,555 
1959  .588 
I960  .616 
1961  .608 
I962  .707 
1963  .723 
1964  .809 
1965  ,834 
,398  ,155  .201 
,410  .I64  .207 
,421  ,180  .226 
.480  ,229  ,231 
,508  ,211  ,224 
.547  ,231  ,236 
.601  ,257  ,245 
,685  ,251  .244 
,716  .258  ,238 
.789  ,266  .260 
.840  ,268  ,270 
.875  ,251  ,269 
.933  .270  ,279 
1.036  ,255  ,279 
1.097  ,274  ,294 
1.176  ,271  ,302 
.29  .43 
.29  .45 
.29  .48 
.29  SO 
.29  .52 
.29  .57 
.29  .64 
.29  .76 
.29  .83 
.29  .87 
.29  .92 
.29  .99 
.29  1.06 
.29  1.13 
.31  1.18 
































































































































0 1966  .854 
1967  ,971 
1968  1.104 
1969  1.149 
1970  1.209 
1971  1.224 
1972  1.257 
1973  1.262 
I974  1.681 
1975  1.871 
1976  2.034 
1977  2.198 
1978  2.509 
1979  2.768 
1980  2.997 
1981  3.264 
1982  3.305 
1983  3.350 
1984  3.350 
1985  3.350 
1986  3.350 
1987  3.350 
1.288  .325 
1.371  .365 
1.512  ,381 
1.667  ,360 
1.856  .347 
1.990  .331 
2.144  .316 
2.281  ,304 
2.452  ,381 
2.562  ,434 
2.681  ,442 
3.023  ,435 
3.323  ,456 
3.589  ,468 
3.883  .461 
4.181  ,467 
4.318  ,461 
4.456  ,454 
4.498  .449 
4.565  ,440 
4.725  .426 























.44  1.29 
.44  1.39 
.44  1.55 
.49  1.65 
.47  1.76 
.47  1.87 
.47  2.00 
.47  2.13 
.60  2.32 
.66  2.56 
.64  2.78 
.64  3.02 
.64  3.36 
.64  3.69 
.64  4.02 
.64  4.39 
.64  4.64 
.64  4.83 
.64  5.02 
.64  5.19 
.64  5.31 
.64  5.33 
1.358  .399 
1.421  ,399 
1.500  .403 
1.552  .399 
1.616  ,428 
1.708  .423 
1.780  ,423 
1.817  ,421 
1.946  ,405 
2.082  .368 
2.174  ,364 
2.240  ,358 
2.340  ,362 
2.483  ,360 
2.716  ,359 
2.954  ,343 
3.175  ,318 
3.321  .321 
3.461  ,334 
3.548  ,331 
3.697  ,351 
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Appendix B 
Log Earnings Equations for Men in Puerto Rico and for 
Migrants to the United States 
Log Wage  Log Annual Earnings 
1980  1970  1980  1970 















-  .51 
(.03 
(W 
-  .40 
-  .15 
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-  .47 
(.02) 
-  .31 
(.02) 










.07  I  ,048 
(.002)  (.003) 
-.39  -.96 
(.04)  (.05) 
(.03)  (.04) 
(.02)  (.04) 
(.03  (.W 
-.07  -.04 
(.03)  (.04) 
-.29  -.60 
-.16  -.24 
-.06  -.I1 
-.07  8.76 
.16  .08 
8,694  6,215 
,127  ,048 
(.001)  (.004) 
-.96  -.52 
(.02)  (.07) 
(.02)  (.05) 
(.02)  (.05) 
(.02)  (.05) 
(.02)  (.05) 
-.57  -.26 
-.37  -.08 
-  .20  -  .04 
-.13  -.04 
7.36  .69 
.23  .07 
26,743  1,912 
,071 
(.002) 
-  .40 
~04) 
-  .29 
(.W 
-  .I6 
(.02) 
-  .06 
(.02) 
-  .08 
(.W 
... 
-  .07 
.16 
8,694 
Source:  1980 and  1970 Puerto Rican and U.S. Censuses. 
Nore: “Mig.* is Puerto Rican men who have migrated to the United States; “PR” is men in Puerto Rico. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Appendix C 
The Effects of Age, Grade, and English Ability on 
Employment in Puerto Rico and Emigration 
to the United States 
Probability Not 
Employed or Paid  Probability Migrant 
5$2.95 in Puerto Rico  Probability Migrant  Adjusted for English 


























Source: 1980 Puerto Rican and U.S. Censuses. 
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